The comment below came from this website: http://flaneurose.blogspot.com/2010/07/liquidated-parallels-between-wall.html
It makes some insightful comments on why Singapore, increasingly looking like a Wall Street investment bank, is losing its edge.
Investment banks are run by greedy, selfish and often unethical sharks. Singapore is run by greedy, selfish and often unethical scholars who think they're morally superior beings.
"Liquidated - Parallels between Wall Street and the Singapore Civil Service"
by flaneurose
THURSDAY, JULY 8, 2010
I recently finished reading Liquidated by Karen Ho. It wasn't an easy read; in fact I skimmed through large chunks of it. Satyajit Das was right in saying that it reads like a doctoral dissertation.
Still, what struck me were some of the similarities between Wall Street investment bankers and how the Singapore civil service governs the country. Perhaps because I had been reading Constructing Singapore concurrently that the similarities popped right out. The parallels may or may not be spurious though; I'll leave that up to the readers of this post to decide for themselves.
First: Wall Street investment banks like to hire the best students from the best universities. Harvard and Princeton are the main hiring grounds, and potential hires are feted and treated like rock stars. Although I attended a relatively second tier institution in the United States during my time in university, even I felt the lure of the investment banks. All week during career week, students came walking out of the Glass Pavilion (an exhibition space in my school) carrying coveted swag from the banks.
Ho in her book postulates that the reason why Wall Street banks focus their hiring almost exclusively on the top universities is because they in effect leverage on the stellar reputation of top-tier universities to give themselves the sheen of prestige and extraordinary capability. That in turn helps to capture business. e.g. Goldman Sachs hires only the best students from Harvard. If you hire Goldman to represent your corporation, you've got the smartest guys in the room playing on your team.
It's not important that the people the investment banks hire really are individuals of the highest calibre. What's really the most important thing is that the perception that Wall Street investment banks hire only the best legitimizes why they can charge the astronomical fees they charge and how they can get away with the financial equivalent of murder when things fall apart. After all, if the smartest guys couldn't have saved the day, whocouldhaveknown???
In my mind, this doesn't seem so different from how the Singapore government insists on academic excellence in its highly credentialed acolytes, and has metrics like the infamous Current Estimated Potential. It's part of the reason why the government can make the boldfaced claim that we have to pay the highest ministerial salaries in the world to keep the good people we have in government, even if the actual performance of our ministers seems to be mediocre unremarkable.
Second: In her book, Ho talks about the myth of "increasing shareholder value". It's like a religion to investment banker types. Everyone in investment banking drinks the Kool-aid and uses the shareholder value argument to justify all kinds of business actions, such as mergers and acquisitions, even though years of academic research have shown that M&As typically destroy more value than they create. But investment bankers can't just sit on their asses doing nuffin'. Got to git them fees rollin' in.
The irony of course, is that the more bankers talk about creating or increasing shareholder value, the less they actually improve it. The opposite is truer more often than not.
Within the Singapore context, the concept of shareholder value is obviously irrelevant. Instead, here, GDP growth is the overriding concern. And every civil servant in Singapore is subject to what I call the tyranny of KPIs.
With regard to GDP growth, the problem is not growth per se, but the quality and sustainability of that growth. What use is growth if it is goosed by massively unsustainable immigration policies, finanical repression (think forced savings, high residential property prices, and low interest rates paid on depositors' funds) and suppressed wages? Worse, the positive aspects of growth are not spread evenly but accrue to those at the top of the income ladder. Yet we reward our highest civil servants and elected officeholders chiefly on the basis of this number. Is it any wonder that we have achieved spectacular GDP growth, but that the fruit of this Pyrrhic victory is bitter indeed?
As for KPIs, the concept is not unsound in theory, but excessive adherence to KPIs blinds the user to other, less tangible measures of performance. If something cannot or will not be measured, then it can't be important, can it? One is reminded of that story of the man searching for his lost keys beneath the streetlamp on a darkened street.
Like the red herring of shareholder value that bankers put forth, we have ministers and CEOs and other high priests telling us that such and such KPIs have been met or even surpassed. That everything is going according to plan. Yet that fails to assuage the disquietude in so many of us, that there are things happening here which are viscerally wrong. Like income inequality. Housing (un)affordability. Rising costs and the fast fading possibility of a comfortable retirement. Or any retirement for that matter. Of how this Singapore ... this place, just doesn't feel like home anymore.
Third: The investment banking industry has notoriously low job security. Job turnover is tremendous. You would think that investment bankers, hired and fired so easily, would have some empathy for the massive numbers of layoffs they're directly responsible for when they advise their client companies to layoff and outsource operations to cheaper countries. Turns out to be the opposite, according to Ho's research. Apparently, it is precisely because bankers have to hustle all the time in their highly volatile industry that they have precious little sympathy for others who can't do the same. Not being able to scramble when the times call for it is considered by bankers to be a personal failing rather than an unfortunate consequence of circumstances.
The highest levels of government in Singapore operate the same way. It's dog-eat-dog within the Admin Service, as is well known, and everyone there aspires to be the top dog. As a purported meritocracy, it was designed that way. A fall from grace from that height would be ... crushing. As a corollary, our senior commanders in the SAF devote great amounts of energy feathering their own nests and constantly keep half an eye on that coveted ministerial, GLC or statboard position for post retirement.
In such a situation, the problems that ordinary people face become mere abstractions, to be described in clinical terms like "structural unemployment". The same sentiment underlies brazen, clueless and flippant exhortations of workers to work "cheaper, better, faster".
That the highest levels of our government are paid handsomely for their work could in fact, be part of the problem, and it's not just me saying this. Research from Harvard indicates that "The More Leaders Make, the Meaner They Get."
Sunday, July 11, 2010
Singapore's overpaid, increasingly detached elite
The comment below came from this website: http://flaneurose.blogspot.com/2010/07/liquidated-parallels-between-wall.html
It makes some insightful comments on why Singapore, increasingly looking like a Wall Street investment bank, is losing its edge.
Investment banks are run by greedy, selfish and often unethical sharks. Singapore is run by greedy, selfish and often unethical scholars who think they're morally superior beings.
COMMENT by
flaneurose
THURSDAY, JULY 8, 2010
"Liquidated - Parallels between Wall Street and the Singapore Civil Service"
I recently finished reading Liquidated by Karen Ho. It wasn't an easy read; in fact I skimmed through large chunks of it. Satyajit Das was right in saying that it reads like a doctoral dissertation.
Still, what struck me were some of the similarities between Wall Street investment bankers and how the Singapore civil service governs the country. Perhaps because I had been reading Constructing Singapore concurrently that the similarities popped right out. The parallels may or may not be spurious though; I'll leave that up to the readers of this post to decide for themselves.
First: Wall Street investment banks like to hire the best students from the best universities. Harvard and Princeton are the main hiring grounds, and potential hires are feted and treated like rock stars. Although I attended a relatively second tier institution in the United States during my time in university, even I felt the lure of the investment banks. All week during career week, students came walking out of the Glass Pavilion (an exhibition space in my school) carrying coveted swag from the banks.
Ho in her book postulates that the reason why Wall Street banks focus their hiring almost exclusively on the top universities is because they in effect leverage on the stellar reputation of top-tier universities to give themselves the sheen of prestige and extraordinary capability. That in turn helps to capture business. e.g. Goldman Sachs hires only the best students from Harvard. If you hire Goldman to represent your corporation, you've got the smartest guys in the room playing on your team.
It's not important that the people the investment banks hire really are individuals of the highest calibre. What's really the most important thing is that the perception that Wall Street investment banks hire only the best legitimizes why they can charge the astronomical fees they charge and how they can get away with the financial equivalent of murder when things fall apart. After all, if the smartest guys couldn't have saved the day, whocouldhaveknown???
In my mind, this doesn't seem so different from how the Singapore government insists on academic excellence in its highly credentialed acolytes, and has metrics like the infamous Current Estimated Potential. It's part of the reason why the government can make the boldfaced claim that we have to pay the highest ministerial salaries in the world to keep the good people we have in government, even if the actual performance of our ministers seems to be mediocre unremarkable.
Second: In her book, Ho talks about the myth of "increasing shareholder value". It's like a religion to investment banker types. Everyone in investment banking drinks the Kool-aid and uses the shareholder value argument to justify all kinds of business actions, such as mergers and acquisitions, even though years of academic research have shown that M&As typically destroy more value than they create. But investment bankers can't just sit on their asses doing nuffin'. Got to git them fees rollin' in.
The irony of course, is that the more bankers talk about creating or increasing shareholder value, the less they actually improve it. The opposite is truer more often than not.
Within the Singapore context, the concept of shareholder value is obviously irrelevant. Instead, here, GDP growth is the overriding concern. And every civil servant in Singapore is subject to what I call the tyranny of KPIs.
With regard to GDP growth, the problem is not growth per se, but the quality and sustainability of that growth. What use is growth if it is goosed by massively unsustainable immigration policies, finanical repression (think forced savings, high residential property prices, and low interest rates paid on depositors' funds) and suppressed wages? Worse, the positive aspects of growth are not spread evenly but accrue to those at the top of the income ladder. Yet we reward our highest civil servants and elected officeholders chiefly on the basis of this number. Is it any wonder that we have achieved spectacular GDP growth, but that the fruit of this Pyrrhic victory is bitter indeed?
As for KPIs, the concept is not unsound in theory, but excessive adherence to KPIs blinds the user to other, less tangible measures of performance. If something cannot or will not be measured, then it can't be important, can it? One is reminded of that story of the man searching for his lost keys beneath the streetlamp on a darkened street.
Like the red herring of shareholder value that bankers put forth, we have ministers and CEOs and other high priests telling us that such and such KPIs have been met or even surpassed. That everything is going according to plan. Yet that fails to assuage the disquietude in so many of us, that there are things happening here which are viscerally wrong. Like income inequality. Housing (un)affordability. Rising costs and the fast fading possibility of a comfortable retirement. Or any retirement for that matter. Of how this Singapore ... this place, just doesn't feel like home anymore.
Third: The investment banking industry has notoriously low job security. Job turnover is tremendous. You would think that investment bankers, hired and fired so easily, would have some empathy for the massive numbers of layoffs they're directly responsible for when they advise their client companies to layoff and outsource operations to cheaper countries. Turns out to be the opposite, according to Ho's research. Apparently, it is precisely because bankers have to hustle all the time in their highly volatile industry that they have precious little sympathy for others who can't do the same. Not being able to scramble when the times call for it is considered by bankers to be a personal failing rather than an unfortunate consequence of circumstances.
The highest levels of government in Singapore operate the same way. It's dog-eat-dog within the Admin Service, as is well known, and everyone there aspires to be the top dog. As a purported meritocracy, it was designed that way. A fall from grace from that height would be ... crushing. As a corollary, our senior commanders in the SAF devote great amounts of energy feathering their own nests and constantly keep half an eye on that coveted ministerial, GLC or statboard position for post retirement.
In such a situation, the problems that ordinary people face become mere abstractions, to be described in clinical terms like "structural unemployment". The same sentiment underlies brazen, clueless and flippant exhortations of workers to work "cheaper, better, faster".
That the highest levels of our government are paid handsomely for their work could in fact, be part of the problem, and it's not just me saying this. Research from Harvard indicates that "The More Leaders Make, the Meaner They Get."
It makes some insightful comments on why Singapore, increasingly looking like a Wall Street investment bank, is losing its edge.
Investment banks are run by greedy, selfish and often unethical sharks. Singapore is run by greedy, selfish and often unethical scholars who think they're morally superior beings.
COMMENT by
flaneurose
THURSDAY, JULY 8, 2010
"Liquidated - Parallels between Wall Street and the Singapore Civil Service"
I recently finished reading Liquidated by Karen Ho. It wasn't an easy read; in fact I skimmed through large chunks of it. Satyajit Das was right in saying that it reads like a doctoral dissertation.
Still, what struck me were some of the similarities between Wall Street investment bankers and how the Singapore civil service governs the country. Perhaps because I had been reading Constructing Singapore concurrently that the similarities popped right out. The parallels may or may not be spurious though; I'll leave that up to the readers of this post to decide for themselves.
First: Wall Street investment banks like to hire the best students from the best universities. Harvard and Princeton are the main hiring grounds, and potential hires are feted and treated like rock stars. Although I attended a relatively second tier institution in the United States during my time in university, even I felt the lure of the investment banks. All week during career week, students came walking out of the Glass Pavilion (an exhibition space in my school) carrying coveted swag from the banks.
Ho in her book postulates that the reason why Wall Street banks focus their hiring almost exclusively on the top universities is because they in effect leverage on the stellar reputation of top-tier universities to give themselves the sheen of prestige and extraordinary capability. That in turn helps to capture business. e.g. Goldman Sachs hires only the best students from Harvard. If you hire Goldman to represent your corporation, you've got the smartest guys in the room playing on your team.
It's not important that the people the investment banks hire really are individuals of the highest calibre. What's really the most important thing is that the perception that Wall Street investment banks hire only the best legitimizes why they can charge the astronomical fees they charge and how they can get away with the financial equivalent of murder when things fall apart. After all, if the smartest guys couldn't have saved the day, whocouldhaveknown???
In my mind, this doesn't seem so different from how the Singapore government insists on academic excellence in its highly credentialed acolytes, and has metrics like the infamous Current Estimated Potential. It's part of the reason why the government can make the boldfaced claim that we have to pay the highest ministerial salaries in the world to keep the good people we have in government, even if the actual performance of our ministers seems to be mediocre unremarkable.
Second: In her book, Ho talks about the myth of "increasing shareholder value". It's like a religion to investment banker types. Everyone in investment banking drinks the Kool-aid and uses the shareholder value argument to justify all kinds of business actions, such as mergers and acquisitions, even though years of academic research have shown that M&As typically destroy more value than they create. But investment bankers can't just sit on their asses doing nuffin'. Got to git them fees rollin' in.
The irony of course, is that the more bankers talk about creating or increasing shareholder value, the less they actually improve it. The opposite is truer more often than not.
Within the Singapore context, the concept of shareholder value is obviously irrelevant. Instead, here, GDP growth is the overriding concern. And every civil servant in Singapore is subject to what I call the tyranny of KPIs.
With regard to GDP growth, the problem is not growth per se, but the quality and sustainability of that growth. What use is growth if it is goosed by massively unsustainable immigration policies, finanical repression (think forced savings, high residential property prices, and low interest rates paid on depositors' funds) and suppressed wages? Worse, the positive aspects of growth are not spread evenly but accrue to those at the top of the income ladder. Yet we reward our highest civil servants and elected officeholders chiefly on the basis of this number. Is it any wonder that we have achieved spectacular GDP growth, but that the fruit of this Pyrrhic victory is bitter indeed?
As for KPIs, the concept is not unsound in theory, but excessive adherence to KPIs blinds the user to other, less tangible measures of performance. If something cannot or will not be measured, then it can't be important, can it? One is reminded of that story of the man searching for his lost keys beneath the streetlamp on a darkened street.
Like the red herring of shareholder value that bankers put forth, we have ministers and CEOs and other high priests telling us that such and such KPIs have been met or even surpassed. That everything is going according to plan. Yet that fails to assuage the disquietude in so many of us, that there are things happening here which are viscerally wrong. Like income inequality. Housing (un)affordability. Rising costs and the fast fading possibility of a comfortable retirement. Or any retirement for that matter. Of how this Singapore ... this place, just doesn't feel like home anymore.
Third: The investment banking industry has notoriously low job security. Job turnover is tremendous. You would think that investment bankers, hired and fired so easily, would have some empathy for the massive numbers of layoffs they're directly responsible for when they advise their client companies to layoff and outsource operations to cheaper countries. Turns out to be the opposite, according to Ho's research. Apparently, it is precisely because bankers have to hustle all the time in their highly volatile industry that they have precious little sympathy for others who can't do the same. Not being able to scramble when the times call for it is considered by bankers to be a personal failing rather than an unfortunate consequence of circumstances.
The highest levels of government in Singapore operate the same way. It's dog-eat-dog within the Admin Service, as is well known, and everyone there aspires to be the top dog. As a purported meritocracy, it was designed that way. A fall from grace from that height would be ... crushing. As a corollary, our senior commanders in the SAF devote great amounts of energy feathering their own nests and constantly keep half an eye on that coveted ministerial, GLC or statboard position for post retirement.
In such a situation, the problems that ordinary people face become mere abstractions, to be described in clinical terms like "structural unemployment". The same sentiment underlies brazen, clueless and flippant exhortations of workers to work "cheaper, better, faster".
That the highest levels of our government are paid handsomely for their work could in fact, be part of the problem, and it's not just me saying this. Research from Harvard indicates that "The More Leaders Make, the Meaner They Get."
Saturday, June 12, 2010
Singapore's booming community of millionaires, and China's striking workers
Check the Times of London story below on China's striking workers.
Communist one-party-ruled China is doing something unprecedented and unique: It is allowing, even encouraging its workers to organise and strike. It is letting its people demand higher wages and better living conditions. Note the two bold paragraphs.
In contrast, Singapore's one-party feudal system is crushing its people and letting the inequality gap widen.
Companies, in particular MNCs, are still making rich profits. Why is this happening?
In one word: SELFISHNESS.
The political leadership is stacked with selfish greedy leaders, and the business community is just taking the cue. The number of millionaires in Singapore has risen to a record level, which the system is proudly trumpeting. Religion has been hijacked by big churches, temples and mosques led by powerful and rich leaders. There are no honest intellectuals left in this country. When the collective leadership has become this selfish, the system has reached its peak. There are no new ideas because the value system is bankrupt and corrupt.
Singapore is nothing but a money-making machine, each man to look out for himself. It's a very sick place that doesn't know it is sick.
TIMES of London report below, 13 June 2010
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/markets/china/article7149002.ece
Reacting to public opinion, a chorus of editorials and commentaries in the state-controlled press praised the trend towards higher pay. “Analysts ... predict that these actions could ultimately bring an end to cheap labour in China,” said the China Daily in a front-page report.
“The Chinese workforce is no longer infinite,” said Zhang Wenkui at the development and research centre run by the state council, China’s cabinet. “It’s finite. That means walkouts and strikes will be more frequent.”
Independent research for The Sunday Times found an epidemic of strikes and bold wage claims in recent months across manufacturing zones.
On May 14, 5,000 workers at a privatised textile factory at Pingdingshan in Henan province, blocked the gates and posted a slogan reading, “We ask our mother, the Communist party, to give us a bowl of rice to eat.” Police arrested four strike leaders, but faced resolute workers angry about alleged corruption in the privatisation process and poor compensation.
In Yunnan province, a taxi drivers’ strike paralysed the city of Honghe and spread to 13 counties. Again, the causes were complaints about extortionate fees and graft.
The China Management Daily, an influential business newspaper, said: “It’s not only Honda that should panic. China should panic, too.”
“The Honda strike is a milestone in China,” said economic analyst Xu Jianfeng in an online commentary. “For ages the people’s government has forbidden working people to go on strike and forbidden the media from reporting strikes, but this time the government failed to do that.”
Powerful lobbies, led by the ministry of commerce and by exporters, are fighting a rearguard action to stop change. However, the sudden upsurge in labour unrest may subtly have reframed the debate. Economists say rising wages in China will help to spur domestic demand and consumption.
Researchers for The Sunday Times examined wage slips that showed many workers for multinational suppliers have seen no rise in pay for eight years. In the same period, consumer price inflation has eroded earning power in real terms and the proportion of China’s GDP taken by wages has fallen.
So higher pay fulfils two aims of China’s more enlightened policymakers. It will give workers more money to spend on goods, and it should also spur Chinese factories to move up the “value chain” and out of the sweatshop era.
Such Chinese firms face a tough time because, to take one example from the state media, most textile factories are surviving on profit margins of 1% to 2%.
But there is no question that foreign middlemen have room to cut their margins. When The Sunday Times tracked a plastic item that retailed in London for 99p back to its source, it emerged that the cost price at the factory gate was 22p. And when the factory’s raw material costs were stripped out, the Chinese supplier had only 6p to cover wages, operating costs and profit.
“In other words, wages could double and it could be absorbed,” said one British buyer.
Communist one-party-ruled China is doing something unprecedented and unique: It is allowing, even encouraging its workers to organise and strike. It is letting its people demand higher wages and better living conditions. Note the two bold paragraphs.
In contrast, Singapore's one-party feudal system is crushing its people and letting the inequality gap widen.
Companies, in particular MNCs, are still making rich profits. Why is this happening?
In one word: SELFISHNESS.
The political leadership is stacked with selfish greedy leaders, and the business community is just taking the cue. The number of millionaires in Singapore has risen to a record level, which the system is proudly trumpeting. Religion has been hijacked by big churches, temples and mosques led by powerful and rich leaders. There are no honest intellectuals left in this country. When the collective leadership has become this selfish, the system has reached its peak. There are no new ideas because the value system is bankrupt and corrupt.
Singapore is nothing but a money-making machine, each man to look out for himself. It's a very sick place that doesn't know it is sick.
TIMES of London report below, 13 June 2010
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/markets/china/article7149002.ece
Reacting to public opinion, a chorus of editorials and commentaries in the state-controlled press praised the trend towards higher pay. “Analysts ... predict that these actions could ultimately bring an end to cheap labour in China,” said the China Daily in a front-page report.
“The Chinese workforce is no longer infinite,” said Zhang Wenkui at the development and research centre run by the state council, China’s cabinet. “It’s finite. That means walkouts and strikes will be more frequent.”
Independent research for The Sunday Times found an epidemic of strikes and bold wage claims in recent months across manufacturing zones.
On May 14, 5,000 workers at a privatised textile factory at Pingdingshan in Henan province, blocked the gates and posted a slogan reading, “We ask our mother, the Communist party, to give us a bowl of rice to eat.” Police arrested four strike leaders, but faced resolute workers angry about alleged corruption in the privatisation process and poor compensation.
In Yunnan province, a taxi drivers’ strike paralysed the city of Honghe and spread to 13 counties. Again, the causes were complaints about extortionate fees and graft.
The China Management Daily, an influential business newspaper, said: “It’s not only Honda that should panic. China should panic, too.”
“The Honda strike is a milestone in China,” said economic analyst Xu Jianfeng in an online commentary. “For ages the people’s government has forbidden working people to go on strike and forbidden the media from reporting strikes, but this time the government failed to do that.”
Powerful lobbies, led by the ministry of commerce and by exporters, are fighting a rearguard action to stop change. However, the sudden upsurge in labour unrest may subtly have reframed the debate. Economists say rising wages in China will help to spur domestic demand and consumption.
Researchers for The Sunday Times examined wage slips that showed many workers for multinational suppliers have seen no rise in pay for eight years. In the same period, consumer price inflation has eroded earning power in real terms and the proportion of China’s GDP taken by wages has fallen.
So higher pay fulfils two aims of China’s more enlightened policymakers. It will give workers more money to spend on goods, and it should also spur Chinese factories to move up the “value chain” and out of the sweatshop era.
Such Chinese firms face a tough time because, to take one example from the state media, most textile factories are surviving on profit margins of 1% to 2%.
But there is no question that foreign middlemen have room to cut their margins. When The Sunday Times tracked a plastic item that retailed in London for 99p back to its source, it emerged that the cost price at the factory gate was 22p. And when the factory’s raw material costs were stripped out, the Chinese supplier had only 6p to cover wages, operating costs and profit.
“In other words, wages could double and it could be absorbed,” said one British buyer.
Friday, June 11, 2010
The Death of Las Vegas: The Future of Singapore's IRs
Singapore's two Integrated Resorts and casinos have been nothing but trouble since they started operating this year.
The police and courts are spending more time dealing with crimes related to the two casinos. More people are getting sucked into gambling and creating social problems.
Worst, the two projects will simply collapse because they depend on gamblers to throw money away. Singapore will soon be hit by the financial and economic problems affecting the US, Europe and Japan, three of their biggest export markets. Story on Las Vegas rapid collapse below is the future of Singapore's IRs.
June 11 2010
There are quite a few U.S. cities that are complete and utter economic disaster zones in 2010 (Detroit for example), but there is something about the demise of Las Vegas that is absolutely stunning. In recent decades, Las Vegas has become a symbol for the over-the-top affluence and decadence of America. But now it is a microcosm of the economic nightmare that has gripped the entire nation. When the subprime mortgage crisis stuck, no major U.S. city was more devastated than Las Vegas. When the recession went from bad to worse, Americans decided that they really didn't need to gamble so much and casino revenues plummeted. Suddenly unemployment started to increase dramatically in Vegas and even today it continues to soar. Like so many other cities that are highly dependent on tourism and entertainment, Las Vegas has gone from boom to bust. Local officials are hoping that the worst will soon be over, but the truth is that the worst is yet to come. As the U.S. economy continues to unravel, average Americans will be spending what little money they do have to put a roof over their heads and to feed their families. The truth is that the glory days of Las Vegas are over and they are not coming back.
Already, the number of unemployed in Las Vegas is reaching unprecedented levels. Unemployment rates for the state of Nevada and for the city of Las Vegas both set new records during the month of April. In Las Vegas the unemployment rate in April was 14.2%. For the entire state the unemployment rate was 13.7%.
Of course those are just the "official" numbers. We all know that the "real" unemployment numbers are much higher.
For example, the "official" unemployment figure is about 14 percent in the state of Michigan right now. But if you actually believe that 86 percent of able-bodied workers in the state of Michigan are employed, then perhaps you would be interested in an offer to purchase the Golden Gate Bridge as well.
Elliott Parker, an economist at the University of Nevada, Reno says that the record-setting unemployment numbers in Nevada are just part of a larger trend....
"Nevada has been losing jobs since March 2008, and we are continuing to do so."
The police and courts are spending more time dealing with crimes related to the two casinos. More people are getting sucked into gambling and creating social problems.
Worst, the two projects will simply collapse because they depend on gamblers to throw money away. Singapore will soon be hit by the financial and economic problems affecting the US, Europe and Japan, three of their biggest export markets. Story on Las Vegas rapid collapse below is the future of Singapore's IRs.
June 11 2010
There are quite a few U.S. cities that are complete and utter economic disaster zones in 2010 (Detroit for example), but there is something about the demise of Las Vegas that is absolutely stunning. In recent decades, Las Vegas has become a symbol for the over-the-top affluence and decadence of America. But now it is a microcosm of the economic nightmare that has gripped the entire nation. When the subprime mortgage crisis stuck, no major U.S. city was more devastated than Las Vegas. When the recession went from bad to worse, Americans decided that they really didn't need to gamble so much and casino revenues plummeted. Suddenly unemployment started to increase dramatically in Vegas and even today it continues to soar. Like so many other cities that are highly dependent on tourism and entertainment, Las Vegas has gone from boom to bust. Local officials are hoping that the worst will soon be over, but the truth is that the worst is yet to come. As the U.S. economy continues to unravel, average Americans will be spending what little money they do have to put a roof over their heads and to feed their families. The truth is that the glory days of Las Vegas are over and they are not coming back.
Already, the number of unemployed in Las Vegas is reaching unprecedented levels. Unemployment rates for the state of Nevada and for the city of Las Vegas both set new records during the month of April. In Las Vegas the unemployment rate in April was 14.2%. For the entire state the unemployment rate was 13.7%.
Of course those are just the "official" numbers. We all know that the "real" unemployment numbers are much higher.
For example, the "official" unemployment figure is about 14 percent in the state of Michigan right now. But if you actually believe that 86 percent of able-bodied workers in the state of Michigan are employed, then perhaps you would be interested in an offer to purchase the Golden Gate Bridge as well.
Elliott Parker, an economist at the University of Nevada, Reno says that the record-setting unemployment numbers in Nevada are just part of a larger trend....
"Nevada has been losing jobs since March 2008, and we are continuing to do so."
Friday, April 2, 2010
Temasek continues to blow our money away on weird projects
Check out the story below from FORTUNE magazine, dated March 26.
Temasek is reported as being ready to "invest" US$1.1 billion on this hare-brained scam. As we all know, Temasek answers to no one. How they waste the people's money is none of your business. The elite runs riot on public resources. The elite will run us all to the ground.
How a big bet on oil went bust
By Adam Lashinsky, senior editor at largeMarch 29, 2010: 10:01 AM ET
http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/26/news/companies/terralliance_tech.fortune/index.htm
(Fortune) -- In the summer of 2008, Erlend Olson thought he had finally hit the jackpot.
A bit player in semiconductors for years, the former NASA engineer had made an improbable metamorphosis into a burgeoning oil-exploration kingpin. His company, Terralliance Technologies, a secretive startup in Newport Beach, Calif., had developed an algorithm for telling petroleum engineers where to drill.
Never mind that Olson was an electrical engineer with no background in oil. He had convinced some of the world's most sophisticated investors, including Goldman Sachs (GS, Fortune 500) and Kleiner Perkins, that his unconventional approach was legit. Kleiner would go on to bet a whopping $93 million on Terralliance, a sum that may be the storied firm's largest venture investment ever.
Terralliance hadn't found much oil, but its founder and CEO was so adept at locating cash reserves that he believed he was about to close a deal that would seal his company's future -- and his fortune.
He had come to New York that August to negotiate a financing with Temasek, the sovereign wealth fund of Singapore, which Olson had been romancing for months. The price of oil had recently soared to $145 a barrel, and Temasek planned to invest $1.1 billion, valuing Terralliance at more than $4 billion.
A hulking figure with a glassy-eyed intensity, Olson had assured his investors that an infusion of this magnitude could lead quickly to a public offering worth as much as $60 billion. That would make Olson, as he wistfully recalled later, a "three-comma guy."
Olson wasn't alone in counting commas. Kleiner Perkins thought it was on the threshold of its first mega-win since Google's (GOOG, Fortune 500) IPO in 2004. Goldman Sachs, which had been betting shrewdly on plummeting housing prices, envisioned another killing. Passport Capital, a young San Francisco hedge fund, anticipated burnishing its reputation for energy investments. John Fredriksen, a Norwegian supertanker mogul who had lent Terralliance $50 million only months earlier, stood to score a quick hit.
All told, the investors had sunk nearly half-a-billion dollars into Terralliance, an astounding sum given the audacity of the company's aspirations -- and the paucity of its accomplishments.
Why experienced investors pumped so much capital into such a risky venture is just one mystery in the tale of Terralliance, a saga that has not been comprehensively told despite the high profiles of the players involved.
Kleiner Perkins, a firm that loudly promotes its most promising investments, for years didn't list Terralliance on its website and declined multiple requests to comment for this article. Despite interviews with many of the key people involved, it's also not clear what exactly Terralliance's technology purported to do, or how well its investors understood it.
What is certain is that Terralliance's gambit to become a force in oil exploration ended badly. Despite Olson's high expectations, the unraveling began during those August 2008 meetings in New York.
Before taking Temasek's cash, Kleiner and Goldman thought it was important to share concerns they had about Olson. Terralliance's globetrotting CEO may have been an oil industry neophyte, but he had spent like a Saudi prince. His shopping list ran the gamut from oil wells in Turkey and Mozambique to demilitarized Soviet fighter jets.
An auditor had raised red flags about Olson's dealings in the Congo and referred its findings to the U.S. Justice Department for potential anti-bribery-law violations.
As troubling, Terralliance had yet to close its books on 2007. Two lead board members, Joe Lacob of Kleiner Perkins and Joe DiSabato of Goldman, informed Temasek's lead negotiator, Nagi Hamiyeh, that they intended to demote the charismatic but free-spending founder to chief scientist.
It was all too much for someone wielding a city-state's checkbook. Instead of signing on the dotted line, Hamiyeh returned to Singapore. In early 2009 the board fired Olson outright. By then the price of oil had cratered, Temasek's stock market holdings had collapsed, and Terralliance had all but crumbled into a heap of litigation, layoffs, and recriminations.
By the spring Kleiner Perkins was in damage-control mode on Terralliance, even as it was promoting a new thrust into the field of "green" energy. As for Olson, who was out of work and raising new funds to continue his global quest for oil, not adding a comma to his net worth was the least of his worries.
Temasek is reported as being ready to "invest" US$1.1 billion on this hare-brained scam. As we all know, Temasek answers to no one. How they waste the people's money is none of your business. The elite runs riot on public resources. The elite will run us all to the ground.
How a big bet on oil went bust
By Adam Lashinsky, senior editor at largeMarch 29, 2010: 10:01 AM ET
http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/26/news/companies/terralliance_tech.fortune/index.htm
(Fortune) -- In the summer of 2008, Erlend Olson thought he had finally hit the jackpot.
A bit player in semiconductors for years, the former NASA engineer had made an improbable metamorphosis into a burgeoning oil-exploration kingpin. His company, Terralliance Technologies, a secretive startup in Newport Beach, Calif., had developed an algorithm for telling petroleum engineers where to drill.
Never mind that Olson was an electrical engineer with no background in oil. He had convinced some of the world's most sophisticated investors, including Goldman Sachs (GS, Fortune 500) and Kleiner Perkins, that his unconventional approach was legit. Kleiner would go on to bet a whopping $93 million on Terralliance, a sum that may be the storied firm's largest venture investment ever.
Terralliance hadn't found much oil, but its founder and CEO was so adept at locating cash reserves that he believed he was about to close a deal that would seal his company's future -- and his fortune.
He had come to New York that August to negotiate a financing with Temasek, the sovereign wealth fund of Singapore, which Olson had been romancing for months. The price of oil had recently soared to $145 a barrel, and Temasek planned to invest $1.1 billion, valuing Terralliance at more than $4 billion.
A hulking figure with a glassy-eyed intensity, Olson had assured his investors that an infusion of this magnitude could lead quickly to a public offering worth as much as $60 billion. That would make Olson, as he wistfully recalled later, a "three-comma guy."
Olson wasn't alone in counting commas. Kleiner Perkins thought it was on the threshold of its first mega-win since Google's (GOOG, Fortune 500) IPO in 2004. Goldman Sachs, which had been betting shrewdly on plummeting housing prices, envisioned another killing. Passport Capital, a young San Francisco hedge fund, anticipated burnishing its reputation for energy investments. John Fredriksen, a Norwegian supertanker mogul who had lent Terralliance $50 million only months earlier, stood to score a quick hit.
All told, the investors had sunk nearly half-a-billion dollars into Terralliance, an astounding sum given the audacity of the company's aspirations -- and the paucity of its accomplishments.
Why experienced investors pumped so much capital into such a risky venture is just one mystery in the tale of Terralliance, a saga that has not been comprehensively told despite the high profiles of the players involved.
Kleiner Perkins, a firm that loudly promotes its most promising investments, for years didn't list Terralliance on its website and declined multiple requests to comment for this article. Despite interviews with many of the key people involved, it's also not clear what exactly Terralliance's technology purported to do, or how well its investors understood it.
What is certain is that Terralliance's gambit to become a force in oil exploration ended badly. Despite Olson's high expectations, the unraveling began during those August 2008 meetings in New York.
Before taking Temasek's cash, Kleiner and Goldman thought it was important to share concerns they had about Olson. Terralliance's globetrotting CEO may have been an oil industry neophyte, but he had spent like a Saudi prince. His shopping list ran the gamut from oil wells in Turkey and Mozambique to demilitarized Soviet fighter jets.
An auditor had raised red flags about Olson's dealings in the Congo and referred its findings to the U.S. Justice Department for potential anti-bribery-law violations.
As troubling, Terralliance had yet to close its books on 2007. Two lead board members, Joe Lacob of Kleiner Perkins and Joe DiSabato of Goldman, informed Temasek's lead negotiator, Nagi Hamiyeh, that they intended to demote the charismatic but free-spending founder to chief scientist.
It was all too much for someone wielding a city-state's checkbook. Instead of signing on the dotted line, Hamiyeh returned to Singapore. In early 2009 the board fired Olson outright. By then the price of oil had cratered, Temasek's stock market holdings had collapsed, and Terralliance had all but crumbled into a heap of litigation, layoffs, and recriminations.
By the spring Kleiner Perkins was in damage-control mode on Terralliance, even as it was promoting a new thrust into the field of "green" energy. As for Olson, who was out of work and raising new funds to continue his global quest for oil, not adding a comma to his net worth was the least of his worries.
Tuesday, March 30, 2010
The Money Grab Gathers Pace
Connect the dots, people. The elite is in a hurry to grab every bit of loose change before you can even finish counting your fingers. Why the rush? and just look at the size of the money grab. They seem to be running scared, like they need blood for an emergency operation. Is the Singapore economy dying? How sick is it?
- "Temasek is raising billions of dollars through the bond market" (BT, March 24)
Temasek bond issues fire up market, By SIOW LI SEN.
"The local bond market is buzzing - issuance has hit $5 billion even before the quarter has ended, helped in no small way by Temasek's five benchmark issues over the last five months."
- They're holding onto a bigger chunk of your CPF money, and for as long as possible.
On March 12, the ST had this strange story, "CPF Life for those with $60,000 at age 65"
"CPF members with $60,000 in their retirement accounts when they turn 65 will be automatically included in the CPF Life annuity scheme, Manpower Minister Gan Kim Yong announced yesterday." This was rushed through Parliament, passed into law one afternoon. There were no previous reports or hint that they were going to impose this new ruling. Nothing leaked about a new rule to hold onto your money at 65. Then, it was announced, and now, everyone is "automatically" a contributor. You have to leave some money in there at 65, and beyond.
- COE prices, sharply higher. http://sg.news.yahoo.com/cna/20100324/tap-561-coes-vehicle-categories-surge-la-231650b.html?printer=1. According to Channel NewsAsia (March 25 2010), COEs for all vehicle categories surged in latest bidding exercise. Prices have shot up by as much as S$14,000 in the latest bidding exercise.
- University fees sharply up. Last month, the three leading Singapore universities, NUS, NTU and SMU, all raised their fees by between 3% and 18% for this year’s students. A month earlier, the polytechnics and technical institutes had announced they would be raising their fees.
- The town councils in Jurong and Aljunied will be raising their service and conservancy charges from April 1, despite their claims to have millions of dollars in surpluses and the fact that Singapore has just suffered its worst recession in 50 years. Some of the other town councils can be expected to follow suit. In 2008, a ST report quoted Khaw Boon Wan, the PAP’s first organising secretary, that its 14 town councils had $2 billion in the sinking funds.
- Temasek setting up a US$3 billion hedgefund called Seatown. Seatown will be doing the gambling to try win back what Temasek lost earlier. another sign of desperation.
Now, for the worst and most painful move yet.
- PM Lee finally emerges from his secret hideout to make this ominous announcement:
“Govt to explore ways to increase use of CPF for buying HDB flats” (Channel News Asia, March 27).
He started off by berating a handful of individuals for selling their HDB flats for a quick profit, and then hinted a very important policy change soon. Sellers may have to return all their profits from the sale of their flats to their CPF accounts. Presently, you get to keep the profits after deducting expenses and the original capital sum which are returned to your CPF account. If PM Lee's hint becomes law, it will be the most drastic money grab in memory. Most people have their wealth stuck in their HDB flats. This means that money is now transferred to the govt. "Your" CPF is really the property of the govt's, or more accutrately, the elite.
The worst of the money grab involves your CPF. That's the people's money, not the PAP's, government's, or even the country's.
Why this desperation? The CPF is the last line of defence. Having lost more than US$100 billion through recklessly gambling away the country's financial reserves, GIC and Temasek are probably in deep trouble, or rather, the country is in deep trouble. The elite refuses to talk about it, and there are now laws or groups that can force them to say anything.
Let's also not forget that the elite just blew $6 billion on that casino, Universal theme park and resort on Sentosa. Another $6 billion will be dumped into the Marina casino. Both will drain the country's finances.
The government has to step in now by using the CPF to support the Singapore currency. Temasek selling bonds is a strange event too. You sell bonds because you need to raise cash. Why is Temasek raising cash? It looks like the elite is imposing capital controls on the people. Singapore is fast sliding down the slippery slope.
- "Temasek is raising billions of dollars through the bond market" (BT, March 24)
Temasek bond issues fire up market, By SIOW LI SEN.
"The local bond market is buzzing - issuance has hit $5 billion even before the quarter has ended, helped in no small way by Temasek's five benchmark issues over the last five months."
- They're holding onto a bigger chunk of your CPF money, and for as long as possible.
On March 12, the ST had this strange story, "CPF Life for those with $60,000 at age 65"
"CPF members with $60,000 in their retirement accounts when they turn 65 will be automatically included in the CPF Life annuity scheme, Manpower Minister Gan Kim Yong announced yesterday." This was rushed through Parliament, passed into law one afternoon. There were no previous reports or hint that they were going to impose this new ruling. Nothing leaked about a new rule to hold onto your money at 65. Then, it was announced, and now, everyone is "automatically" a contributor. You have to leave some money in there at 65, and beyond.
- COE prices, sharply higher. http://sg.news.yahoo.com/cna/20100324/tap-561-coes-vehicle-categories-surge-la-231650b.html?printer=1. According to Channel NewsAsia (March 25 2010), COEs for all vehicle categories surged in latest bidding exercise. Prices have shot up by as much as S$14,000 in the latest bidding exercise.
- University fees sharply up. Last month, the three leading Singapore universities, NUS, NTU and SMU, all raised their fees by between 3% and 18% for this year’s students. A month earlier, the polytechnics and technical institutes had announced they would be raising their fees.
- The town councils in Jurong and Aljunied will be raising their service and conservancy charges from April 1, despite their claims to have millions of dollars in surpluses and the fact that Singapore has just suffered its worst recession in 50 years. Some of the other town councils can be expected to follow suit. In 2008, a ST report quoted Khaw Boon Wan, the PAP’s first organising secretary, that its 14 town councils had $2 billion in the sinking funds.
- Temasek setting up a US$3 billion hedgefund called Seatown. Seatown will be doing the gambling to try win back what Temasek lost earlier. another sign of desperation.
Now, for the worst and most painful move yet.
- PM Lee finally emerges from his secret hideout to make this ominous announcement:
“Govt to explore ways to increase use of CPF for buying HDB flats” (Channel News Asia, March 27).
He started off by berating a handful of individuals for selling their HDB flats for a quick profit, and then hinted a very important policy change soon. Sellers may have to return all their profits from the sale of their flats to their CPF accounts. Presently, you get to keep the profits after deducting expenses and the original capital sum which are returned to your CPF account. If PM Lee's hint becomes law, it will be the most drastic money grab in memory. Most people have their wealth stuck in their HDB flats. This means that money is now transferred to the govt. "Your" CPF is really the property of the govt's, or more accutrately, the elite.
The worst of the money grab involves your CPF. That's the people's money, not the PAP's, government's, or even the country's.
Why this desperation? The CPF is the last line of defence. Having lost more than US$100 billion through recklessly gambling away the country's financial reserves, GIC and Temasek are probably in deep trouble, or rather, the country is in deep trouble. The elite refuses to talk about it, and there are now laws or groups that can force them to say anything.
Let's also not forget that the elite just blew $6 billion on that casino, Universal theme park and resort on Sentosa. Another $6 billion will be dumped into the Marina casino. Both will drain the country's finances.
The government has to step in now by using the CPF to support the Singapore currency. Temasek selling bonds is a strange event too. You sell bonds because you need to raise cash. Why is Temasek raising cash? It looks like the elite is imposing capital controls on the people. Singapore is fast sliding down the slippery slope.
Sunday, March 28, 2010
An Outcome of The Elitist Culture
You keep reading about how Singaporeans treat their fellow citizens as second rate objects. How did this come about? When an elitist culture takes hold, people do not treat each other with respect and kindness, but with disdain and as items to be ranked in a social hierarchy.
This elitist attitude has filtered into the mainstream and has become part of the ugly Singaporean culture. Why do we have maids, and why do so many Singaporeans treat them as slaves and servants? Singapore children order their maids around because they see their parents behave as such.
Thus, Singapore bosses, with their access to cheaper foreign labour will not want to cultivate "local talents". These "local talents", on the other hand, do not see the need to be loyal and to stick around and provide long-term service. We end up with a vicious cycle of disloyal and cynical behaviour.
Where do the people learn all this from?
Just check out how our political leaders treat the people with disdain. They demand obedience and good behaviour from everyone, while reserving for themselves a different set of standards. They do not need to explain anything to anyone, and certainly do not need to account for their mistakes. An excellent example of such elitist behaviour is exhibited by Teo Ho Pin, the Mayor of North West District. Several of our town councils have lost a lot of money speculating in Wall Street toxic products. We wonder when he's going to explain, and whether he sees the need to explain anything to anyone.
This elitist attitude has filtered into the mainstream and has become part of the ugly Singaporean culture. Why do we have maids, and why do so many Singaporeans treat them as slaves and servants? Singapore children order their maids around because they see their parents behave as such.
Thus, Singapore bosses, with their access to cheaper foreign labour will not want to cultivate "local talents". These "local talents", on the other hand, do not see the need to be loyal and to stick around and provide long-term service. We end up with a vicious cycle of disloyal and cynical behaviour.
Where do the people learn all this from?
Just check out how our political leaders treat the people with disdain. They demand obedience and good behaviour from everyone, while reserving for themselves a different set of standards. They do not need to explain anything to anyone, and certainly do not need to account for their mistakes. An excellent example of such elitist behaviour is exhibited by Teo Ho Pin, the Mayor of North West District. Several of our town councils have lost a lot of money speculating in Wall Street toxic products. We wonder when he's going to explain, and whether he sees the need to explain anything to anyone.
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